Capturing contested states : structural mechanisms of power reproduction in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro by DZANKIC, Jelena
 1 
Capturing contested states: structural mechanisms of power reproduction in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro 
 
JELENA DZANKIC, European University Institute1 
 
Abstract 
This article argues that external state contestation and internal ethnic divisions have 
resulted in a high degree of state capture in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and 
Montenegro, thus providing structural mechanisms for the reproduction of power of 
political elites. The article focuses on two dominant forms of state capture – party 
membership in public administration and the privatization process. First, by examining 
the extent to which party membership influences the composition of public 
administration, the article explains the solidification of the link between electoral 
preferences and job security. Second, by looking at the privatisation of state assets, the 
article shows how state capture facilitated the elites’ accumulation of private wealth. 
The latter developed into subsidiary networks for financing political parties, offering 
resources for corruption, clientelism and patronage that are key to the reproduction of 
political power in captured states.  The article concludes by exploring the implications 
of the link between state contestation and state capture in the Western Balkan states.  
 




The fall of the Iron Curtain across Eastern Europe sparked a recalibration of political 
structures across the continent. The emergence of a number of states, and the dynamics 
of political change therein, gave rise to a substantial amount of literature about the 
transition of political systems from communism to democracy. The shift from political 
monoliths and planned economies to pluralism and open markets in the new 
democracies gave rise to voluminous literature about state capture in the transitional 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Goetz 2001; Hellman, Jones and Kaufman 
2004; Innes 2014; Roland 2004; Stark and Bruszt 1998). However, only a handful of 
academic efforts have focused on the informal and preferential structures that affect the 
making and implementation of laws in the contested Western Balkan states, which have 
been trapped in the process of transition since the early 1990s.  
Academic studies focusing on the unconsolidated and challenged post-Yugoslav 
states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro have concentrated 
primarily on the debates over post-conflict state-building, or the divisions over 
statehood and nationhood (Dzankic 2015; Jenne and Bieber 2014; Juncos 2005; Keil 
2013; Koneska 2014; Marko 2005). What has been underplayed, however, is that these 
dynamics are played out within - even by the standards of other former Yugoslav 
republics – a very specific structural, political and cultural framework. This framework, 
characterised by structural anomalies resulting from external state contestation and 
internal ethnic divisions, has enabled a high degree of state capture in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. More specifically, the unsettled statehood 
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and identity issues have provided the political elites with a tool for legitimising the 
takeover of the structural mechanisms for the reproduction of political power. 
To begin to fill this gap, this article focuses on the structural anomalies inherent 
in three different post-Yugoslav political systems, and discerns how these systemic 
glitches have been maintained by the ruling elites to pursue their objectives. The 
research posits that these specific structural anomalies emerge within different types of 
political systems, whereby issues of nationhood, statehood and identity have largely 
determined the character and trajectory of politics after the fall of communism. To that 
end, the empirical analysis uses the examples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia 
and Montenegro, three countries that are contested internally by different ethnic 
communities that inhabit them, and externally, by the kin states of those minorities or 
other neighbouring countries.2  
Despite these ostensible similarities, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and 
Montenegro have developed very different social, political and economic courses after 
the breakup of Yugoslavia. The Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina established Europe’s most complex multinational state; a country still 
torn by internal ethnic divisions; a country in which ethnic elites have captured different 
aspects of economic and social structures (Bieber 2002; Bose 2002; Keil 2013; Marko 
2005). In contrast to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia seceded peacefully from 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, but was faced with a conflict between ethnic 
Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in 2001, at the time when the Balkan region 
experienced the ‘democratizing turn’ (Vachudova 2006). The Ohrid Framework 
Agreement (OFA) ended the conflict and introduced a form of decentralised 
consociational democracy. It also established channels for the ethnicisation of politics in 
the country on behalf of the two dominant ethnic communities. Their political elites 
used the structural anomalies brought about by the current constitution to capture the 
state and reproduce their political power, a dynamic also reinforced by external 
contestations of Macedonia’s statehood and nationhood by neighbouring Greece. In 
Montenegro, which remained in a federation (and then a state union) with Serbia until 
2006, the same structure of power has de facto held power since 1945: Democratic 
Party of Socialists (Demokratska Partija Socijalista, DPS. The monolith of the ruling 
party remained intimately intertwined with the state, a dynamic reinforced by the 
internal ethnic divisions between Montenegrins and Serbs and the tense relationship 
between Montenegro and Serbia in the post-independence period.  
This article explores the effects of seizing structural, cultural and economic 
resources in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. By doing so, the 
article demonstrates that internal ethnic divisions and external contestations enabled the 
political elites to remain in power by capturing the state.  The article focuses on two 
interrelated forms of state capture – party membership in public administration 
(structural and cultural resources) and the privatization process (economic resources). 
While illustrating party dominance over a specific type of resources, these two forms of 
state capture enable a mutually reinforcing circle of state capture. That is, in addition to 
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controlling electoral results, party membership in public administration allows for the 
control over public procurement. In turn, this lucrative element of state capture enables 
the elites to acquire economic resources needed for maintaining the grip over the 
structural and cultural capital of the country.  
First, by looking at the extent to which party membership has influenced the 
composition of public administration, the article explains the mechanics of power 
reproduction through the solidification of the link between electoral preferences and job 
security. Second, by looking at the privatisation of previously owned state assets, the 
article demonstrates how state capture facilitated the elites’ accumulation of private 
wealth. The latter developed into subsidiary networks for financing political parties, 
offering resources for corruption, clientelism and patronage that are key to the 
reproduction of political power in captured states. The article concludes by highlighting 
how state contestation enables state capture in the Western Balkan states and proposes 




State Capture in Post-Communism 
 
In order to understand the specificities of how the mechanics of state capture in the 
Western Balkan countries has played out, it is essential to comprehend the dynamics of 
elite recruitment in the post-communist period. This focus will enable an analysis of 
how the top echelons of political parties used structural, political and cultural resources 
of states to ascend to power or reinforce their position therein. In the literature which 
focuses on post-communist transition, two ostensibly competing streams may be 
derived from Pareto’s elite theory (Pareto 1968) to explain what happens to the ‘old 
elites’ with the fall of a system: elite reproduction (elite remains in power) and elite 
circulation (elite removed from power). In the context of the former Yugoslavia, while 
the former posits that the old ‘nomenklatura’ remained at the top of the system 
(reproduction), the latter suggests that a structural change occurred at the very top of the 
political landscape opening up the prospect for the emergence of new elites (circulation) 
(Szelenyi and Szonja Szelenyi 1995, p. 616). 
 In considering the applicability of these theories on the Western Balkan states, 
this article posits that elite reproduction and elite circulation are not mutually exclusive. 
In different contexts, however, one of them will have more explanatory power than the 
other. Which one is more helpful and relevant will depend on the extent to which old 
and new elites have had access to the political, economic and cultural resources in the 
country during political transition. In cases when the old elites prevailed over all of the 
three types of resources mentioned above (social, cultural, economic), elite reproduction 
occurred from the socialist into the democratically organised system. In the opposite 
cases, elite circulation ensued when the new (competing) elites from within or outside 
the system had access to political, economic, or cultural resources of a polity. As a 
consequence, revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe did not necessarily change the 
elite structure. Elites, after all, never willingly renounce the power that they have 
acquired in the ‘old system’, and once one form of political power and legitimacy has 
eroded, elites sought to shift their ideological focus and adapt their rhetoric in order to 
preserve their power (Hankiss 1990). 
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 In view of the structural and cultural resources, particularities of the 
unconsolidated countries of the Western Balkan states need to be taken into account. 
Domestic and external challenges to statehood and nationhood provided ample 
opportunities for elites promoting particular national projects and ideologies to ascend 
to power (Kolsto 2014). In this respect, claims to culture served as a legitimation for the 
capture of the states’ institutional frameworks and the power distribution among 
competing national communities. Even if such claims to culture differed significantly 
ab initio in the three cases examined, and even though they followed different 
trajectories after the fall of Yugoslavia, patterns of elite reproduction remained. The 
distribution of powers after the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina enabled 
the elites from the three ethnic communities to legitimize and consolidate control over 
the state’s structures, marginalising and suppressing the access points for alternative 
political arrangements and communities. The Sejdic and Finci vs. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina judgment of the European Court of Human Rights is a prime example of 
how an internationally mediated post-war constitution never substantially revisited can 
have an exclusionary effect on communities that do not belong to the key ethnic 
groups.3 Power-sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina has also affected the composition of 
public administration, and facilitated its capture by the ethnic elites.  
In a similar vein, international arrangements for power-sharing have also 
enabled the Macedonian ethnic elites to seize the structures of the state by ethnic elites. 
After the signing of the OFA, the distribution of power in the country led to a further 
and formal ethnicisation of the Macedonian and Albanian communities. This was the 
case since both ethnic communities emphasised the ‘boundaries and interests of ethnic 
groups’ (Koneska 2015: 11) in implementing the power-sharing provisions. As a 
consequence of the ethnicisation of politics in Macedonia, the elite circulation that took 
place in the mid-2000s in this country replaced the reformed socialists with parties each 
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pushing forward their increasingly ethnicised agendas (Vangeli 2011). In the context of 
domestic divisions and external challenges to the country’s statehood, ethnic elites 
cemented their agendas in the state’s structural resources through the capture of the 
public administration.  
Unlike in the two other cases, Montenegro’s political landscape has been 
marked by the continuation of the rule of the DPS, the heir of the League of 
Communists of Montenegro. The continued DPS rule would imply that reproduction of 
elites, rather than circulation took place in the Montenegrin politics. Notwithstanding, 
partial elite circulation occurred in two instances – the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ of 
1989 and the DPS split of 1997. In 1989, the old communist elites were superseded by a 
set of newly emergent leaders who, while ostensibly a modern and progressive force, 
retained the bureaucratic character of the previous system (Dzankic 2014). Moreover, 
they ascended in the relative absence of counter-elites powerful enough to generate a 
viable political challenge. Cultural capital, however, was immersed into the nationalist 
rhetoric of the ruling elites ever since the early 1990s.4 As a consequence, the 
reproduction of the ‘next-in-line’5 former communist elites was uninterrupted in 
Montenegro until the split in the DPS in 1997. After the split, the faction of the DPS 
that held the political and economic resources remained in power (reproduced); the 
other faction became opposition in Montenegro (circulated downwards). The 
subsequent re-framing of agendas of these two elite factions in the context of 
Montenegro’s relationship with Serbia induced a polarisation between self-declared 
Montenegrins and Serb citizens in Montenegro (Dzankic 2014). Similar to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Macedonia, the DPS, which remained in power emphasised the 
rhetoric of ethnic identity of Montenegrins. Such rhetoric, in turn, facilitated the DPS’s 
control over public administration, and amplified possibilities for consolidating the 
political power of Montenegro’s dominant political party. 
 The capture of structural and cultural resources has also been coupled with that 
of economic resources through the process of privatisation. In the transitional literature, 
privatisation has been viewed as the process of transfer of ‘property rights from the state 
to private agents’ (Lavigne 1999, p.162). While the removal of state property was at the 
core of this process, privatisation had major economic and political implications for 
transitional societies (Bornstein 1992; Jackson 1992). In economic terms, privatisation 
facilitated the establishment of a new class of capitalists functioning within a market 
that was no longer organised through the state’s plans. In political terms, it reduced the 
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state’s role in shaping the economic outlook and shifted the focus of power from 
political to economic elites. However, the mechanisms of privatisation throughout 
Eastern Europe have shown the symbiosis between the political and economic elites. 
The access to political power at the time of major systemic changes and in the absence 
of the rule of law or checks and balances facilitated the seizure of economic resources 
by top party echelons. According to Lavigne (1999), political elites used the process of 
post-communist transition to attain private wealth within this context. Possessing 
established networks (as members of the old communist nomenklatura they could easily 
achieve this end. In what Jadwiga Staniszkis (1991) describes as ‘political capitalism’, 
old socialist elites developed into a new capitalist class, and what they held as 
communist party power was converted into capitalist power. 
 These dynamics indicate that changes in the structure, or indeed the outlook, of 
the political power in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro have been 
based on a combination of historical and sociological factors related at least in part to 
the unconsolidated identities in the region. These factors have affected the cementing of 
political elites in two interlinked ways. First, the perpetuation of the old-style 
bureaucracy over the twenty-plus years of post-communist transition has assured the 
preservation of the intimate link between parties and the state. Second, the maintenance 
of these links facilitated access to and extraction of resources, which in turn further 
enabled the elites to catalyse their interests through the state. An additional important 
factor that has contributed to such state capture has been the poor track record of the 
establishment and consolidation of democratic culture (e.g., norms and the rule of law) 
in the Western Balkans. The lack of experience with the democratic system further 
facilitated the dominance of ethnic agendas in states whose social, cultural, and political 
contexts are challenged domestically and externally. Such dominance was key in 
enabling political elites to seize and maintain the resources of the state. 
 
 
Composition of Public Administration 
 
In post-war transitional countries, the political environment marked by strong ethnic 
cleavages enables the capture of the state administration by the dominant ethnic 
communities. Structural frameworks that have been established in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro since the Yugoslav breakup have allowed the 
dominant political elites to establish a series of informal and preferential networks that 
affect the making and implementation of laws (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2000, 
p.2). This process has been amplified by a perpetuating absence of robust competition, 
i.e., a critical governing alternative, which would constantly question the policies of the 
ruling elites, thus helping to build democratic institutions. Grzymala-Busse (2007, p.1) 
highlights that a robust competition ‘induces anxious governments to moderate their 
behaviour, create formal state institutions, and share power – in short, to construct 
safeguards against the extraction of state resources’. By contrast, the inexistence of such 
a competition reinforces the vicious circle of state capture: structurally weak, 
disorganised or corrupt opposition parties are unable to thwart state capture; incumbent 
elites, who have captured the state work actively to prevent the creation of a viable 
opposition.  
The following sections provide an analysis of the dynamics of state 
administration capture rather than details of the process. They highlight how ethnic 
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divisions have reinforced the grip of political parties over the state, regardless of 
whether the (reformed) communist rule continued after the Yugoslav breakup or not. 
While communist elites originally circulated and gave way to nationalist elites in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the latter managed to seize the state and reproduce themselves 
within the system. In Macedonia, the former communist elites originally remained in 
power and captured the state, but were overthrown by the nationalist ones, who ‘re-
captured’ the state; and in Montenegro the former communist elites stayed in power 
initially but embraced the national project, which then became a catalyst for elite 
reproduction. In other words, in divided and challenged societies reproduction of 
nationalist elites is dependent on state capture, while non-nationalist elites can circulate 
despite their stronghold on political power.  
 
The Bosnian triangle of ethnicised public administration 
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the substantial role of supervision of the international 
community that followed the war developed for some years into an ambitious and 
thorough reform effort, aimed to fully restructure the institutional setup of the state to 
primarily accommodate the preferences of the three ethnic communities (Annex IV, 
Dayton Peace Agreement 1996). While indeed the country’s institutions have been 
modified compared to the pre-war period, the success of the underlying reform for the 
efficient functioning of BiH democracy has been questioned by international actors, 
policy analysts and academics (European Stability Initiative 2012; International Crisis 
Group 2012; Keil and Perry 2015; Shkaratan 2005). Milovich and Ossewaarde (2013) 
have highlighted that the failures in the restructuring of public administration in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina emanate from the relationship between ethnic communities in this 
post-war, post-communist country and the international community; each with its own 
vision of the country’s sovereignty and a different perspective on the country’s 
institutional setup.  
 On the one hand side, public administration reform has been engrained in the 
country’s statebuilding and principles of ‘good governance’ including transparency, 
legitimacy and accountability, norms themselves engrained in EU accession conditions 
(Bieber 2004; Lazinica 2011). Yet, the inability to substantially push forward different 
reform processes, according to Blagovcanin and Divjak (2015), is largely attributable to 
the effective capture of public administration by ethnic political parties. The major 
ethnic political parties emerged in the early 1990s,6 with the demise of Yugoslav 
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socialism, and were involved in the war as well as the development of the peace accord. 
Since the end of the war, the power-sharing that institutionalised ethnic divisions among 
Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, demotivated a comprehensive transformation of programs 
and agendas of these political parties. As a consequence of this, while initially faced 
with elite circulation (from communist to ethnic elites), there has been a continuous 
process of ethnic elite reproduction in post-war Bosnia.   
The inexistence of detailed and comprehensive regulation of the funding and 
functioning of political parties at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina, rather than at the 
level of entities, was a further factor that contributed to elite reproduction after the war. 
Perpetuation of the same political parties with few changes in their top echelons, has 
enabled parties and their leadership to consolidate positions of power. That is, it enabled 
them to seize control over the state’s resources.7 Linking the question of internal party 
organisation to the control over the public administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Blagovcanin and Divjak (2015, p. 9) highlight that, 
[t]he internal party election process is fraudulent. Senior party leaders appoint 
their loyal supporters as delegates to the election conventions or assemblies. 
These in turn vote for the leaders who appointed them, helping them get re-
elected. Lists of candidates for the general elections are drawn up in a similar 
manner. Loyal party supporters get appointed into managerial positions in public 
enterprises or political offices in local governments. Once appointed to these 
positions by the party leaders they are expected to provide party funding. The 
appointments within a party are never merit or competence based, but rather 
contingent on loyalty to the party leadership. 
The intimate link between party membership and public administration has also been 
emphasised in Shkaratan’s (2005) study for the World Bank, where she noted that 
employment in public administration is dependent on political affiliation. Its key 
repercussion in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been the establishment of a network in 
which jobs in public administration are allocated in a politicised and corrupt manner.8 In 
turn, the allocation of positions in the public administration is key to political elites to 
influencing decision making processes at lower levels, including the adoption and 
implementation of legislation. Weak fiscal autonomy of municipalities (funded by taxes 
collected by entities) has led to the situation in which ‘[n]ational political parties and 
central government authorities wield considerable influence over local officials, who 
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7 For instance, the 2012 Law on Financing Political Parties has been criticised for offering a leeway to 
corruption. Transparency International (2012) has noted that the system of donations foreseen by the law 
enables to manipulate party finances by ‘registering fictive members’.  
8 For example, legislation on civil service and public administration prevents termination of employment 
when governments alter. However, new governments often amplify the public sector and introduce new 
positions for party loyalists. 
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risk losing financing or political support for their projects if they do not fall into line in 
areas such as election campaigning’ (Jahic 2015: 154).  
 
Consociation and State Capture in Macedonia 
 
The issue of state capture in Macedonia is also highly salient. After the OFA, public 
administration positions have been allocated in line with equitable representation of 
national minorities at state and municipal levels. However, positions for minority 
representatives are often distributed in line with party membership (Lyon 2011; 
Kacarska 2012). Minorities also seldom receive key positions in public administration. 
Hence even though the formal aspects of equitable representation are respected, there is 
no substantive effort at ensuring adequate participation of minorities in the country’s 
governance. 
 Drawing on the findings of an UNDOC study, Stojanoska (2011) notes that 
despite the legislative measures that have been introduced in order to prevent the 
influence of political parties on public administration, malpractice in recruitment in 
Macedonia is persistent. In effect, the implementation of the legislative measures aimed 
at eradicating corrupt recruitment processes in the country is hampered by the 
reproduction, since 2006, of the ruling Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation 
– Democratic Party for National Unity (Vnatresna Makedonska Revolucionarna 
Organizacija – Demokratska Partija za Nacionalno Edinstvo, VMRO-DPMNE). Since 
it ascended to power, the VMRO-DPMNE party has reorganised the Macedonian public 
administration in a way that a number of former employees associated with the 
country’s opposition or with no party affiliation have been removed or relocated. At the 
same time, new workplaces have been created for supporters of the new government 
(Faktor 2015, web). 
Therefore, VMRO-DPMNE has captured the public administration, facilitating 
the party’s influence over the functioning of the state (Cvetkovska 2012; Lyon 2015). In 
addition to this, McEvoy (2014: 187-188) highlights that the Macedonian ruling party 
has effectively blocked the principle of equitable representation at higher administrative 
levels by citing the lack of education and skills of the Albanian minority population. 
This issue has also been highlighted by representatives of the ethnic Albanian 
Democratic Union for Integration (Demokratska unija za integracija, DUI), which has 
been a part of the governing coalition with the VMRO-DPMNE since 2008. 
 The degree of state capture in terms of employment in public administration in 
Macedonia came to the centre of political developments in February 2015, when the 
leader of the opposition Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (Socijal Democratski 
Sojuz na Makedonija, SDSM) released tapes of illegally wiretapped individuals, 
including VMRO-DPMNE high officials, academics, civil society representatives, and 
employees in public administration. The tapes contained information regarding  
direct influence on the judiciary including dismissing criminal charges against 
government ministers, appointment of party loyal judges, influence on the 
media, selective prosecution of political opponents, mass electoral fraud during 
past elections, using fictive voters, fake ID cards, buying votes, registering up to 
50 such voters at individual addresses and instructing them to vote for the ruling 
party, intimidation of public servants including threats to fire them if they do not 
vote accordingly, attempts of stealing election material, misuse of police and 
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public administration for party agenda, and pressure on individuals and firms 
(CRPM 2015, p.1). 
While the country’s government denies its grip over public institutions, the 
revelation of the tapes has raised significant questions on the functioning of 
Macedonian democracy, and a number of academics have highlighted a slip towards 
authoritarianism in the country (Bieber 2015; Keil and Dzankic 2015). Yet, 
significantly, this rise of authoritarianism and the capture of the state’s institutions have 
been facilitated by domestic and external contestations of the country’s statehood and 
nationhood. Both the on-going nation-building project of the Macedonian elite (Vangeli 
2011) and the conflict over the country’s name with Greece have given rise to a populist 
discourse that facilitates state capture in the country. Hence Macedonia is an example of 
a country in which elite reproduction from the socialist period, followed by elite 
circulation in 2006, and the reproduction of ethnic elites ever since, have had state 
capture as their final result. This indicates that state capture is intimately related to 
domestic divisions in and external contestations of the country, which enable elite 
reproduction even after initial circulation. 
 
 
Montenegro: Unchanged Melody 
 
Unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, Montenegro is a unitary state and 
ethnic differences are not managed through power-sharing. Yet the political transition 
of this former Yugoslav republic has been characterised by extreme elite reproduction 
and the rule of the reformed communist party ever since the introduction of political 
pluralism in the early 1990s. The DPS, as the ‘heir’ of the Communist Party, retained 
most of the institutional and structural networks in Montenegro. In the first half of the 
1990s, the international trade embargo allowed for the flourishing of a shadow 
economy, in which the DPS leadership had a central role. According to Uzelac, the grip 
that the political elites held over the Montenegrin institutional setup at the time of 
international sanctions allowed for the creation of irregularities in the process of 
transition (Uzelac 2003:108; Malesevic and Uzelac 2007: 697). In turn, these 
transitional irregularities allowed a small oligarchy to use the power vacuum at the top 
of society, created by the fall of the previous system, in order to seize the state and gain 
wealth and power (Medojevic 2001: 7-10).  
As a consequence of deep political divisions resulting from the division over 
statehood and identity, robust competition, in terms of a critical opposition that would 
serve as a mechanism of constraint over the extraction of state resources, never existed 
in Montenegro. Hence, a genuine circulation of elites did not occur in communist or 
post-communist Montenegro. Instead, the anti-bureaucratic revolutions of 1988/89 
changed the leadership of the League of Communists of Montenegro, and the 1997 split 
of the DPS cemented the dominant faction of this party in power. The division over 
identity and statehood that followed the DPS split only reinforced the state capture as it 
detracted society from transitional issues. It created a framework in which the DPS 
vindicated its dominance over the state’s institutions as the representative of the 
‘Montenegrin’ people. However, the relationship between the party and the state 
remained unchanged.  
The structure of opportunities for elite reproduction in Montenegro is partly 
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attributable to the strength of the communist party in the smallest republic of the former 
Yugoslavia. The proportion of economic resources and political positions that 
Montenegro received from the socialist establishment in Yugoslavia were larger than 
those of the other republics of the former Yugoslavia compared to their size (Roberts 
2007, p. 423; also, Rastoder 2003). As a consequence, allegiance to the party was higher 
in Montenegro than in the other republics of the former Yugoslavia. This prevented the 
emergence of a critical opposition at the time of the first multiparty elections in 1990, 
when the communists won the majority (56.18%) of the popular vote. The election 
rounds of 1992 and 1996, conducted in line with D’Hondt seat allocation formula,9 
produced a similar outcome, favourable for state capture at the time of economic 
sanctions. During the period of the wars in Montenegro’s immediate neighborhood, 
coupled by international isolation in light of international sanctions against rump 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), only the reformed communist elites had access to 
the resources of the state and to channels for the use of those resources. Yet, while elite 
reproduction in Montenegro allowed for the capture of the state in the first instance, the 
fact that the state was captured by the ruling elites ensured the continuation of the DPS 
rule. This created the vicious circle of elite reproduction through the political and 
economic resources of the state. As a consequence of the structure of opportunities 
described above, even before the 1997 split the united DPS took the opportunity to seize 
the state during the time of the embargo.  
After the split, the majority of the formerly owned state assets remained the 
property of the DPS wing that remained in power. The control over employees in public 
administration was exerted during electoral cycles, when they were commonly 
intimidated or ‘motivated’ through benefits such as promotions to vote for the ruling 
party (Jovicevic 2013). The nature of political competition in Montenegro and the 
mesmerisation of the population into parties’ nationalist agendas after the Yugoslav 
breakup has largely contributed to this process. Specific to the case of Montenegro, the 
support of the international community for the democratization of the country in the late 
1990s was used to subsidise the public companies, increase the salaries in the public 
sector, and to expand the administration (Huszka 2003:56). In turn, this created a public 
administration intimately related and loyal to the ruling elite, which persists to this day. 
In this case, the lack of a credible democratic opposition enabled communist elite 
reproduction and the initial state capture in Montenegro. The questions of independence 
and national identity then transformed the former communist party into a party engaged 
in a nation-building project. This transformation of the DPS, coupled with the seized 




The process of privatisation of state assets has been a major source of power for the 
nationalist political elites in the divided states of the Western Balkans. Mechanisms 
through which the process has granted preferential access to the formerly owned state 
assets to the top echelons of political parties have contributed to their grip over the state, 
thus cementing the vicious circle of state capture, nationalism and corruption. In all 
																																																								
9 D’Hondt seat allocation formula favours large parties and coalitions. 
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three cases, mechanisms of direct sale of state assets as well as mass voucher 
privatisation have been used.  
 
The Eth(n)ics of Privatisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the shift from socialism and war to ‘political pluralism and 
economic liberalism’ was accompanied by state capture, nepotism, cronyism and 
corruption (Singer 2000: 31). The process of privatisation of formerly state-owned 
enterprises is the best example of the link between failed economic transition and state 
capture in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Privatisation in this country started in the late 
1990s; almost a decade later than in other post-communist countries.  
Due to the complex post-war structure of the country, there was no institution at 
the state level that would oversee privatisation. The process was implemented at the 
levels of the two entities, who held almost all state assets after the war. Separate 
privatization agencies were established in each of the two entities, and in addition to 
this, in each of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in 
Brčko District. The multitude of separate agencies, each acting in line with the entity 
and cantonal rules, contributed to the inefficiency of the process (Transparency 
International 2011).  
Moreover, privatisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been ethnicised from the 
beginning. This ethnicisation has been most manifest in mass voucher privatisation. 
Buff (cited in Donais 2002: 2) has highlighted that in both entities, most of the vouchers 
used for privatisation had been granted to veterans and widows of war ‘from their “side 
of conflict’.  In addition to this, this aspect of the process of privatisation in the 
Republika Srpska required individuals to register in order to obtain company vouchers. 
This enabled entity administration to discriminate against minority populations and 
refugees. As Donais (2002: 6) noted, the process of privatisation   
reveals a two - pronged strategy by ruling parties on all three sides of  Bosnia’s 
ethnic divide: first, delay the process as much as possible, since within the 
tripartite Bosnian partocracy a state-owned enterprise is as good as a party-
owned enterprise; and second, ensure that whatever privatization does take place 
leaves former state enterprises in the hands of either (in descending order of 
preference) the ruling parties themselves, their friends and allies, or their ethnic 
compatriots. 
 The other aspect of privatisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the direct sale of 
the state’s assets was as problematic as mass voucher privatisation. While the process 
included some broad monitoring on the behalf of the international community, above all 
the USAID, 80 per cent of privatisations in the country failed (Associated Press 2014, 
web). This left almost a hundred thousand workers unemployed (Zurnal 2013). In 
exploring the process of international oversight, Donais (2002: 5) noted that ‘USAID 
has viewed privatization as a technical rather than a political exercise, and has been 
more concerned with the fact of privatization than with the identity of the new owners’. 
The lack of appropriate oversight along with the inadequacy of the country’s institutions 
for transitioning towards a regulated capital market has resulted in the transfer of the 




Early Start and Re-start in Macedonia 
 
Unlike in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the process of privatisation in Macedonia was 
initiated already in the early 1990s, due to this country’s peaceful separation from the 
former Yugoslavia. The Macedonian Law on Transformation of Enterprises with Social 
Capital was adopted in 1993 thus enabling the transfer of the state –owned capital to 
private owners. While the formal aspects of the process were largely successful, given 
that a decade after the start of privatisation over 90 per cent of enterprises had been 
privatised (OECD 2012), the implementation thereof enabled preferential access to 
political elites of the SDSM, which was the ruling party in Macedonia at the time. 
According to Sadiku (2013), a ‘rapid and comprehensive privatisation weakened the 
possibility for the formation of any resistance or political discourse that would mobilise 
around the defence of public good’.   
 The mechanisms of privatisation largely contributed to state capture by the 
SDSM in the 1990s. For instance, company shares were not sold at their real but at a 
nominal (estimated) value (Shajnoski 2015). This implies that the estimates that were 
set for the value of companies varied in accordance with whether shares were purchased 
through citizens’ vouchers or by direct acquisition. While their cost would be higher in 
the first case, it would decrease in the latter and funds would be ‘pumped in’ or 
‘pumped out’ of companies to regulate their nominal price. Shajnoski (2015) notes that 
the Macedonian Tobacco Company (AD Makedonija Tabak) was illegally devaluated 
ahead of privatisation. This reduced the stock price hence enabling easy access to the 
top party echelons in possession of funds. Yet the failed restructuring of these 
companies led to their bankruptcy and increased the unemployment level in the country 
to 30 per cent; a percentage of unemployment that persists to this date (Sadiku 2013). 
Such a course of privatisation contributed to the overall perception of the population 
that the public good had been robbed. Coupled with the conflict in Macedonia, the 
deeply flawed privatisation contributed to the removal of the SDSM from power in 
2006.  
Since the key aspects of the privatisation process had been concluded during the 
rule of the SDSM, the current ruling elite implemented a ‘re-privatisation’ by opening 
the country’s market to foreign capital without previously adopting adequate regulation 
(Princip 2015). The foreign capital was primarily aimed at financing the activities of a 
network close to the ruling VMRO and subsidising various aspects of the ‘antiquisation’ 
process. A total of 260 individuals and enterprises took part in the government-
sponsored project ‘Skopje 2014’ aimed at changing the outlook of the country’s capital 
by emphasising the roots of Macedonian nationhood in antiquity. However, BIRN notes 
that in this half-a-billion euros worth endeavour, preferential contracts had been given 
to companies close to the VMRO-DPMNE government, and highlights that 
Beton construction company has won most contracts and built most of the 
buildings and sculptures that form part of Skopje 2014. The company has earned 
€163 million, a third of all the money spent on the revamp, from the project. 
Four other construction companies, Granit, Strabag, Beton–Stip and Bauer BG, 
follow as big players (BIRN 2015, web).  
Hence the VMRO-DPMNE government deployed re-privatisation and re-capitalisation 
as mechanisms to reinforce its political position and to reproduce itself in power. The 
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case of Macedonia is an outlier in this respect, and shows an interesting dynamic 
between economic resources and political power. The original privatisation was 
conducted by the reformed communists who used it to seize the resources of the state. 
Yet, the seizure of the state assets was a necessary yet not sufficient condition for the 
perpetuation of the SDSM elites. With the ascent to power of the nationalist elite in 
2006, economic resources became central to state capture. Elite circulation, therefore, 
led to the second wave of privatisation, which included the public service sector that 




In the case of Montenegro, the consolidation of the economic power base was 
particularly significant for the ruling DPS. The subsequent processes of privatisation 
and economic reform were only an extension of that state capture aimed at reinforcing 
the party’s grip over Montenegrin economic structures. This privatisation occurred in 
two waves: 1) in the late 1990s, when the DPS’s agenda changed from reformed 
communism to instrumental nationalism; and 2) in the mid-2000s, when Montenegro 
became an independent state and the DPS sought to ensure its dominant political 
position in Montenegro. 
 Uzelac (2003, p. 107) noted that in the years immediately after the DPS split, 60 
per cent of the state-owned capital was privatised, while the 40 per cent that remained in 
the ownership of the state were the largest contributors to Montenegro’s GDP. The 
latter included the more profitable companies such as the Aluminium Plant in 
Podgorica, Telecom Montenegro, and the Electricity Company – all of which were 
headed by people close to the ruling DPS. For instance, in the late 1990s, the former 
DPS president Milica Pejanovic – Djurisic became the president of the management 
board of Telecom Montenegro; while Mihailo Banjevic - Djukanovic’s close ally – 
became the general manager of the Aluminium Plant. At the same time, the companies 
that were privatised were often sold under irregular conditions to ‘friendly firms’ 
(Medojevic 2001, pp. 7-12); that is to companies owned by DPS’ allies. This first wave 
of privatisation was central to the DPS’s longevity in power. Without the economic 
resources, the DPS would have been unable to pursue its ‘creeping independence’, 
distance itself from the Belgrade authorities and subsequently redefine the content of 
Montenegrin identity.10 At the same time, those very processes helped the DPS to 
reproduce itself within the captured economic and political system. 
																																																								
10 In addition to companies, the issue of media privatisation was particularly salient. Up until a month 
before the Presidential elections in 1997 (after the DPS split), there was only one printed daily newspaper 
in Montenegro – Pobjeda. Having undergone several unsuccessful attempts of privatisation, Pobjeda is 
still state-owned and has been an ‘extended hand’ of the government. Being the only permanent source of 
information to the public until 1997, this newspaper and the National Broadcasting Service (RTCG) had 
an important influence on the formation of public opinion both during the wars of the Yugoslav 
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The second wave of privatisation in Montenegro regarded precisely the 
companies such as the Aluminium Plant Podgorica (KAP), Telekom, and the Electricity 
Company (EPCG) – all major contributors to the state’s GDP, yet companies that 
remained under state ownership in the late 1990s. Ceranic (2015: 1) notes that these 
‘[p]rivatisations were often prepared and conducted behind closed doors, with 
companies often sold to allegedly murky businessmen or investors with close ties to 
high-ranking state officials’. The KAP, Montenegro’s key exporter, was privatised in 
2005. Although there had been a formal tender, the company was privatised by Russian 
tycoon Oleg Deripaska, following his negotiations with the Montenegrin Prime Minister 
Milo Djukanovic (Vlahovic and Prelevic 2005). The failure of the investor to meet his 
obligations to restructure the company led to the KAP bankruptcy in 2012 and a 350 
million euros loss to the Montenegrin state budget (European Commission 2013).11  
The lack of transparency in the course of privatisation also occurred in the case 
of the formerly state-owned telecommunication company, sold to Magyar Telecom in 
2005. In 2012, the United States’ Securities Exchange Commission revealed that prior 
to the acquisition of the company Magyar Telecom ‘made € 7.35-million in corrupt 
payments to government officials in Montenegro to facilitate the acquisition of 
Montenegrin Telekom’ (Ceranic 2015: 6). While the link between the privatisation of 
Telekom and the government’s officials had been discussed in the Montenegrin 
Parliament, the parliamentary committee charged with investigating the case failed to 
reach consensus and take action (Conclusions adopted by the Parliament of 
Montenegro, Podgorica, 29 December 2013). Further to this, 43 per cent of the 
country’s electricity company EPCG was sold in 2009, to the Italian company A2A 
owned by the former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Zola (2013) notes that the sale 
was preceded by a number of meetings between Berlusconi and Djukanovic, and that 
the tender arrangement foresaw the investment of privatisation funds in Prva Banka 
Crne Gore, a bank owned by Aco Djukanovic, the brother of the Montenegrin Prime 
Minister Milo Djukanovic.  
Snapshots of these key instances in the first and second waves of privatisation 
point to two important issues that link the seizure of the state’s economic resources and 
political power. The first wave of privatisation was ‘domestic’ and largely used by a 
circle close to the DPS elite to seize the state and push forward their political goals. The 
second wave was ‘external’ and included the channelling of foreign funds through the 
elites that had previously captured the country’s economic resources. This, in turn, 





disintegration (Pavlovic 2004; Andrijasevic 2001), as well as in the period preceding and following the 
country’s independence.  
11 Losses to the state budget are compensated through a one euro tax on citizens’ telephone, electricity 
and cable TV bills. 
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The study of political and economic transitions in Eastern Europe has indicated a strong 
trend towards state capture aimed at elite reproduction in the early years after the fall of 
communism. The lack of experience with democratic systems grounded in the rule of 
law and the “Wild West” economic transformation, coupled with elites who emerged 
from grassroots nationalist movements or “reformed” communists, had as its 
consequence the concentration of institutional, economic and political resources of the 
state in the hands of the few. Akin to this trend that was pronounced in Eastern 
European countries in the 1990s, the unconsolidated Western Balkan countries are also 
experiencing state capture. In the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and 
Montenegro, this occurrence has largely been facilitated by factors including the post-
conflict/post-war environments, divided societies and contested states.  
 Strong contestations among ethnic communities and domestic and external 
challenges to sovereignty have underpinned the rise of nationalist elites. The 
environment of uncertainty, in which society is distracted from transitional issues for 
the sake of ‘national questions’, has offered ample opportunities to political elites to 
develop mechanisms for capturing the state and preventing political opponents or new 
political options from rising to positions of power. In the studied countries, the 
installation of cadres loyal to incumbent political parties in the public administration 
and privatisation of previously state owned assets have been two key mechanisms for 
capturing the state in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro.  
  In all three countries, the process of appointment in public administration is not 
based on meritocracy but on party membership, which is commonly an informal 
condition for obtaining a position in public administration. In turn, appointing party 
members in the state’s institutions serves a twofold purpose for political elites in the 
context of state capture. First, having loyal persons within public administration 
facilitates elite’s grip over the drafting and implementation of legislation, as well as 
control over the distribution of the state’s resources (e.g., financing of projects, party 
finances, etc.). Second, exceptionally oversized public administrations in the Western 
Balkan states provide for a large pool of votes. Hence, associating party membership to 
employment in public administration has become one of the key elements that political 
parties, such as the Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE or the Montenegrin DPS, use in order 
to stay in power.   
 Equally, the capture of the former property of the state through privatisation 
processes has also provided political elites in the divided states of the Western Balkans 
with significant resources used to cement their political power. Common to all three 
cases has been the tendency to offer preferential access to individuals loyal to the top 
echelons of political parties in the process of direct sale of the state’s assets. In addition 
to this, voucher privatisations in which the state companies were sold through shares 
have also proven to be a major mechanism for capturing the state, since shares were 
offered to citizens at a nominal value, which fluctuated not in line with supply and 
demand laws, but in line with ‘who was in demand’. As a result, the process opened 
preferential routes for wealth accumulation to those who were close to the top party 
echelons in the subsequent waves of privatisation. In turn, this provided resources for 
corruption, clientelism and patronage that became key for capturing the contested 
Western Balkan states. 
 In a broader context, the large patronage networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia and Montenegro have weakened the democratisation prospects of these 
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three countries. The large patronage networks pose an obstacle to citizens’ protests. 
Simultaneously, opposition parties are structurally weak, disorganised, and often as 
corrupt as those in power. Such a situation reinforces the vicious circle of state capture, 
as no domestic actor has sufficient cultural, structural or domestic resources to 
challenge the elites’ stronghold on power. It also raises a major field for future research 
investigating the role of the international community, and above all the EU, in 
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